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Abstract The notion of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) “element of real-
ity” is much discussed in the literature on the foundations of quantum mechan-
ics. Recently, it has become particularly relevant due to a proposed criterion
of the physical reality of a given quantum mechanical observable [A. L. O.
Bilobran and R. M. Angelo, Europhys. Lett. 112, 40005 (2015)]. We exam-
ine this proposal and its consequently related measure of non-locality [V. S.
Gomez and R. M. Angelo, Phys. Rev. A 97, 012123, (2018)] and argue that
the criterion is ill-described as quantifying physical reality without introducing
serious inconsistency with the basic notions of realism that under-gird enquiry.
We agree that this reality criterion demonstrates, along with the famous GHZ
results, that general quantum observable values make for poor elements of
reality. However, we also argue that this does not mean no such elements of
reality are to be found in quantum theory. By arguing for, and adopting, prob-
ability distributions as these elements of reality instead, we demonstrate that
the criterion of physical reality is actually one of observable predictability. We
then examine the relationship of realism-based non-locality to the Bell form
and find that, despite the flawed premise, this measure does indeed codify
non-locality that is not captured by Bell inequalities.
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1 Introduction
The discussion of “elements of reality” may seem like pure philosophy with-
out any operational relevance. However, it is much discussed in recent physics
literature on quantum theory (see [1,2,3,4,5,6,7] for prominent examples).
Additionally, [8] proffers a quantitative “criterion of the physical reality of a
quantum observable”. The measure put forth is heavily couched in the lan-
guage of quantifying whether observables are “elements of reality” in the sense
invoked by the EPR paper [9]. This is further used in [10] to produce a measure
of non-locality that is sourced from how much the reality of quantum observ-
ables is affected by distant measurements. This is of some significance, as it is
known that quantum systems can exhibit non-locality that is not captured by
the Bell inequalities [11,12,13] or similar measures of this phenomenon. Thus,
it is important that the premises of these measures of reality and non-locality
are interrogated to determine whether they actually quantify what they claim
to.
The aforementioned criterion of reality asks the operational question: “how
definite was the value of the observable A given a state preparation ρ?” If A
had a pre-determined value then it has reality 1, if it has spectrum of values
with assigned probabilities then it has reality < 1. This therefore assigns the
designation “element of reality” to any value of a quantum observable that
can be predicted with certainty, particularly this applies to actual measured
values. Intuitively this seems reasonable as quantifier of reality, as perhaps the
most basic commitment of scientific realism is the idea that there is a pre-
existing world that can be interrogated by our measurements1. Therefore, if
some quantity is not pre-defined prior to measurement then it is not completely
real. This agrees with the EPR definition as well, as “elements of reality” are
physical quantities that can be predicted with certainty with disturbing the
system in question. Thus, the measure from [8] is claimed to extend a reality
criterion to mixed states as well eigenstates of observables. Following this line
of reasoning we see that a general quantum state may have no real properties
at all until it is measured and some observables obtain real values. This follows
in the foot steps of the famous GHZ scenario [14,15], in which it is shown that
measurement of a system of three entangled qubits is inconsistent with the
notion that all of spin values for each axis and qubit were pre-assigned by
state preparation. We can see the commonality with [8] in that real properties
emerge from interaction with quantum systems (like measurement). In the
GHZ case this can then be construed as a refutation of the idea of the EPR [9]
“element of reality” [16]. Despite their use of the EPR criterion it is hard to
avoid the same argument for [8], as we are similarly lead to conclude that for
any general scenario real properties emerge from the interaction of quantum
systems rather than being pre-existent. This tension with the EPR criterion
does far more than these arguments want to deliver, as it is a tension with
the notion of some underlying pre-existent reality, which undermines the very
1 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/
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basis of scientific enquiry. Stated as baldly as this, the over-reach of claiming
that some reality quantification demonstrates that real properties can only
emerge from interaction with quantum systems and that therefore the state
corresponds to no “elements of reality” itself becomes almost paradoxical. As
one must immediately ask why the real properties that emerge from interaction
with a given state have statistical predictability if the state itself possesses no
real properties until measured? It seems then that by showing that values of
observables do not generally correspond to elements of reality it is concluded
that the EPR definition has failed, but the persistence of the predictability
needed by the EPR criterion should give us pause. Perhaps, if a quantification
of reality is inconsistent with some basic realism, that must indeed premise its
quantification, then it was not quantifying what we believed it to be.
Thus, the premise of this article is to study the notion of the physical real-
ity of quantum observables as presented by [8] and to show that by assuming
elements of reality are assigned to measured observable values it only succeeds
in quantifying the predictability of those observables. In addition to this it will
be shown that the GHZ result does not provide the grounds for a wholesale
rejection of EPR “elements of reality” in quantum mechanics, contrary to the
argument in [16]. This argument is built upon the notion that all of these
claims about reality are actually claims about classicality, and that the con-
flation of these two explains the inconsistency with scientific realism outlined
above. It is argued that the very fact we can predict the GHZ outcome with
certainty immediately undermines the claims of a failure of the EPR crite-
rion. The probabilities of measurement outcomes in quantum mechanics are
then put forward and demonstrated to posses all the necessary properties of
an EPR element of reality. The failure of observable values as general EPR
elements of reality stems from the elementary observation that only statistical
objects could fulfil this role in quantum theory as this explicitly statistical
formalism cannot be used to infer the ontological status of non-statistical ob-
jects [17]. This serves to undermine any claims about quantifying the reality
of observables, reducing the conclusions of [8] to showing that observable val-
ues’ ontological status is outside of the scope of the quantum formalism and
what they quantify is purely observable predictability. The failure of the cen-
tral premise of the non-locality criterion of [10] requires us to examine what
it is actually measuring. Despite the shaky foundation, it is shown that it
does indeed quantify non-locality that it not captured by the Bell inequality
as claimed by the authors of [10]. However, the relationship discussed in [18]
is reduced to a trivial one of a complementarity between predictability and
information.
The argument is presented as follows: in section 2 we discuss the criteria
presented in [8,10] and examine some simple unintuitive consequences that
they represent. In section 3 we discuss what properties of quantum systems
can actually have their ontological status inferred from empirical measure-
ments and argue that the EPR element of reality is alive and kicking in sec-
tion 4. We then proceed to examine realism-based non-locality in section 5.
Our conclusions are summarised in section 6.
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2 The reality of observables
The measure of the physical reality of an observable presented by [8] is criterion
based upon whether the value of a given observable was predefined by the
preparation of the state ρ. To be more concrete they imagine a situation where
ideal state tomography is being carried out on a prepared stated ρ. However,
before the state can be measured it is intercepted and has an observable A
measured without the result being revealed. Thus, the state being measured
is in fact
φA(ρ) =
∑
a
|a〉 〈a| ρ |a〉 〈a| , (1)
where the sum runs over eigenvalues a.
The “irreality” of A given ρ is then defined as
I(A|ρ) := S(φA(ρ))− S(ρ) , (2)
with S being the von Neumann entropy. This quantity is non-negative and
vanishes only when ρ = φA(ρ). Thus, it will always vanish if the state ρ is an
eigenstate of A. In agreement with the EPR criterion, eigenstate preparations
are always elements of reality, but this also attempts to generalise beyond this
and quantify the reality of mixed states as well. This criterion is premised, as
is apparent, on the idea that observable values become real once they have
been measured.
It is immediately apparent that I will be < 1 for many choices of mixed
state ρ. Thus, for a general quantum state, observables like A will not consti-
tute elements of reality (in agreement with the GHZ results [14]). We might
then be tempted to compare the reality of quantum versus classical physics,
with the perplexing result that classical observables are elements of reality
but quantum ones are not in general. This suggests that despite being more
fundamental than classical physics, and thus more ontologically real, quantum
mechanics references no general elements of reality. This is inconsistent with
any basic notion of scientific realism, and with the idea that classical physics is
a derivative reality sourced from something more fundamental. Alternatively,
we could argue that the notion of “elements of reality” is actually invalid,
and that reality results from the interaction of quantum systems. However,
although this sounds more sophisticated than the preceding argument these
both seem to be easily restated with “classical” substituted for “real” with-
out losing anything in the process. This suggests that we should be cautious
of the use of I as irreality, as this may well be misleading. However, I does
characterise the degree to which we can predict the value of an observable A.
Of additional importance are the cases in [8], where it is shown that ob-
servables for non-separable systems are not maximally real and that this is
also true for simultaneous measurement of non-commuting observables. These
cases are instructive as they suggest that I may in fact be a measure of the
classicality of an observable. As the principle cases in which irreality is to be
found are those where the quantum and classical mathematical formalisms di-
verge. This is reinforced when we note that in classical physics both theoretical
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predictions of statistics and individual observable values can be compared to
empirical results and thus can be tested for some ontological value. However,
in the quantum case this option is not available. This is because all quantum
predictions stem from an inherently statistical formalism and it is elementary
that no statistical premise may lead to a non-statistical conclusion. This simple
line of argument immediately suggests to us that quantum mechanics cannot
operationally quantify the reality of of a given observable, only the reality of
associated statistics. So in asking a quantification of the predictability of an
observable to act as a measure of reality we are inherently demanding that
reality behave classically.
In order to examine this issue in more detail we must proceed to study
what properties of a quantum system can actually have their ontological value
determined. That is, we must ask the question of what properties of quantum
systems will the success or failure of experimental tests reflect upon. This
question is necessary as these are the only quantities that can reasonably
satisfy the EPR definition and qualify as elements of reality.
3 Properties of quantum systems
Quantum mechanical observables do not constitute well behaved “elements
of reality”, as evidenced both above and by the GHZ experiment. Thus, the
notion of an “element of reality” should be disposed of, quantum properties
are not pre-determined and result from interaction with the system itself. This
argument seems to be robust, but there is a crucial twist that we need to follow,
we implicitly assumed that only the values of the observables themselves can
constitute the properties of quantum system. Without this assumption it is no
longer clear that we are forced to reject the existence of “elements of reality”,
perhaps it is simply that values of quantum observables do not constitute these
elements within the evidently statistical framework of quantum mechanics?
This argument should especially be suggested to us by the fact that the GHZ
outcome is predictable with certainty, surely something real must under-gird
this happen-stance? Clearly the EPR definition has not been truly disposed of.
We should expect this, as the criterion is analytic [19], and to declare it does
not apply at all in quantum mechanics must also throw out the root notion of
scientific realism: that there is some independent reality to interrogate. What
has happened then is that the “element of reality” that allows the GHZ result
to work at all, rather than output subjective gibberish, is not the individual
value of observables within quantum theory.
This problem should be expected, as there is, in general, no measurement
that can be made on a quantum state ρ whose correspondence with prediction
would depend upon the ontic status of the value of an observable A. In other
words, quantum mechanics predicts statistical patterns to the behaviour of
quantum states and thus by comparing observed and predicted outcomes of
experiments we determine whether outcome probabilities p(a|A, ρ) have any
basis in what is real. If these probabilities had no correspondence to an underly-
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ing reality then this would be revealed by their failure to match the observed
statistics. Furthermore, probabilities obviously cannot be tested by singular
statements of measurement. Thus, within the framework of quantum mechan-
ics there is no singular measurement of an observable A that depends upon
the correspondence of the value of A with some underlying reality. For this
to occur, we must be able to derive non-statistical conclusions from statistical
premises [17]. Simply put, the theoretical formulation of quantum mechanics
makes it clear that the definiteness of values of observables A cannot be con-
sistently used as criterion of what has ontological value within the quantum
paradigm. This does not necessarily imply values of A are irreal, merely that
there is no such information within the quantum formalism. This is then what
we learn from both the work of [8] and GHZ, rather than grand claims about
the nature of reality.
The eagle-eyed reader has already spotted that this argument seems to fail
for GHZ cases, as their central importance is that they are “one-shot” mea-
surements that do not require us to accumulate statistics. However, the notion
of the “one-shot” measurement needs some careful attention. To elucidate it
consider the classical example of the pressure of a gas which we can predict
through statistical physics. This is a “one-shot” measurement, but the suc-
cess of our predictions reflects upon our statistical assumptions about velocity
distributions of particles in the gas. Even though, barring error analysis, we
did not need to accrue statistics, we did not avoid the fact that all we were
testing was the validity of our statistical assertions. The same is true for the
GHZ case, as the outcome prediction arises directly from the same quantum
mechanical formalism that predicts probabilities, we did not step outside the
states and amplitudes framework and use a separate apparatus to produce re-
sults that were premised on the validity of individual observable values. Thus,
we are still implicitly testing our statistical assertions about the behaviour of
quantum states, regardless of whether the measurement required us to accrue
statistics or not.
4 Elements of reality reborn
We have seen in the previous sections that observables are not generally ad-
equate as elements of reality in quantum mechanics. This does not mean,
however, that such elements are not to be found. An obvious quantity that is
predictable with certainty without disturbing the state of a system is provided
in the form of the probability distributions for outcomes of the measurement
of a given observable A, p(a|A, ρ) (which relates closely to the claims in [1,2,
3,4,5,6,7] of the quantum state encapsulating all relevant elements of reality).
A reader might point out that the EPR criterion clearly specifies a “physical
quantity” and thus might question whether p(a|A, ρ) could satisfy this require-
ment. To clarify this we can consider an illustrative classical example, that of
a Maxwell-Boltzmann velocity distribution. Such a distribution can be used
to predict the properties of an approximately ideal gas. Were the distribution
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not, in some way, a statement of the physical properties of the gas itself this
would not be possible without some violation of physical law or other mira-
cle. Thus, it is argued that objects like p(a|A, ρ) could not be used to predict
outcome frequencies, and thus observable averages, unless they were in some
way reflecting physical properties of the system represented by the state ρ.
The argument in favour of the ontic nature of probability distributions
still feels weak. All that was required is to satisfy a no-miracles argument, and
p(x) may still depend strongly on how much information a given observer has.
However, consider the Maxwell-Boltzmann case again, this time we imagine
that we have precise knowledge of the position and momenta of all particles
at some time t and perform N -body simulations to determine the statistical
properties of the gas by averaging. If the statistical properties predicted by
the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution match those measured, the only way this
could be true would be if our N -body simulation yielded the same answers.
This of course implies that probability distributions predicted by our statis-
tical theory are informationally complete (within their domain of testability)
and thus have no meaningful observer dependence. This can be viewed from
another angle by considering the operational aspects of the maximum entropy
method advocated by Jaynes [20]. In this case the accurate modelling of sta-
tistical properties requires that we have an exhaustive list of constraints on
our system. For the modelling of a physical system these constraints can only
take the form of assertions about relationships between physical properties.
In other words if our predictions for p(x) fail to fail we have strong evidence
that our probability distributions are informationally complete (on a statisti-
cal level of course), as we neither have too many nor too few constraints. In
quantum mechanics we have no analogous N -body case to appeal to, however,
we do have the generality of the above argument and the theorems assert-
ing that the wavefunction ψ is informationally complete within the statistical
form of quantum mechanics (for instance [1,2]). The consequence of this is
that we can be safe in assuming our p(x) to be ontic rather than epistemic,
this conclusion is also reinforced by the failure of the EPR argument for the
incompleteness of quantum mechanics.
Significantly the quantities p(a, b|A,B, ρ) are mutually definable with the
same certainty regardless of whether or not A and B commute. More impor-
tantly, their representation of physical properties is easily inferred from their
predictive success, unlike individual measurements of A or B, as argued above.
A reader might also be unsatisfied by the fact that these probabilities are
not the properties of an individual electron for instance. But rather, the prop-
erties of an electron within a given situation. Once again we stress the analogy
to the statistical properties of a gas, pressure for instance requires the presence
of a confining force but is still determined by the internal physical properties
of the gas itself, despite the additional dependence on the external situation.
This is no different to the observation that a classical particle behaves differ-
ently in different potentials, but, knowledge of these potentials can be used
to deduce the internal properties (mass and charge) of the particle itself from
this behaviour. These internal propensities to respond to external influence
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are also what we extract in analogous quantum situation. They are merely
all the information available within the structure of quantum theory, as this
structure codifies what we can seek to measure when testing the theory.
The choice of p(a|A, ρ) as the elements of reality is important, as it does
not lead us to conclude quantum mechanics is less real than the classical
case or require us to conflate real with classical. This is because the statistics
inferred from quantum mechanics will have more predictive success and thus
can be seen as unambiguously more real. This clearly establishes that neither
a criterion for the reality of observables, or the abandonment “elements of
reality” establish a consistent/workable idea of realism in the same manner as
adopting p(a|A, ρ) (and perhaps ρ itself) as the elements of reality. Moreover,
it clearly demonstrates that conflating the predictability of observables with
their reality, without a careful examination of the theoretical formalism, leads
to deep inconsistencies. Thus, the quantification from [8] is not a criterion of
reality at all, we are forced to stop at “criterion of predictability”.
5 Realism-based non-locality
Having established what [8] actually quantify, we must now turn to the ex-
tension of this work to quantifying non-locality that stems from quantum
measurements influencing the reality of observables. This is the realism-based
non-locality of [10]. In short, if we envisage a scenario with two entangled
sub-systems each prepared in state ρ and sent to be measured in a space-like
separated arrangement. An additional system is prepared in a known state and
allowed to interact locally with only one of the sub-systems prior to measure-
ment, with the new state now being ΦB(ρ) in this subsystem. The non-locality
in question is then whether the reality of an observable A has been changed
in the sub-system that did not suffer the local perturbation. This is quantified
by
∆I(A,B|ρ) = I(A|ρ)− I(A|ΦB(ρ)) (3)
In the preceding section with established that I was in fact a measure of
predictability of observables, rather than their reality. So we are now equipped
to see what ∆I(A,B|ρ) actually tested. This is evidently the effect of dis-
tant measurements on the predictability of measurement outcomes, or whether
p(a|A,B, ρ) = p(a|A, ρ) under these conditions. This provides a more relaxed
test for the effects of non-separability than a Bell inequality, which demands a
correlation in p(a) and p(b) that exceeds what is possible under a hypothesis
of local causality. The quantity ∆I instead informs us of any non-separability
related correlation between the outcome probabilities, as for separable states
∆I → 0 so separable correlations will perforce be ignored. This means that,
despite the flawed premise of the reality criterion, the non-locality measure
does indeed capture aspects of non-separability that are not captured by the
Bell inequality as claimed by the authors in [10].
This has consequences for other work based on [8], such as [18] where a
complementarity between information and the reality measure of observables
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is discussed. With the arguments presented here we can see that this relation-
ship is reduced to triviality, as it is evident that there is a complementarity
between Shannon information [21] measures and predictability of the observ-
ables encoding this information.
6 Conclusion
In this work we examined whether cases which quantify the reality of ob-
servables in quantum mechanics [14,8] actually reflect in some way upon the
underlying ontological situation. It shown that, because quantum mechanical
predictions are inherently based upon statistical assumptions, that only statis-
tics can have their ontological status inferred from the success or failure of
quantum mechanical predictions without introducing contradictions with ba-
sic tenets of scientific realism. This means that [8] does not in fact quantify the
reality of observables but merely their predictability (which is also more easily
defined operationally). However, despite the failure of the underlying premise,
the non-locality measure proposed in [10], based on [8], does indeed quantify
non-locality not captured by Bell inequalities. This non-locality, however, is
not related to the reality of observables at all, merely how their predictability
varies as a result of non-separability.
In addition to this, we refute arguments that we should discard the idea of
elements of reality in quamtum mechanics, or that no such elements can exist,
by demonstrating that probabilities assigned to various outcomes satisfy all
the necessary requirements and do not result in any clashes with notions of
scientific realism.
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